Shadow banking (SB) makes a significant contribution to financing the real economy and is intricately connected with the regulated banking sector (RBS). This article illustrates how transmission of systemic risk from SB to RBS can be modelled in order to enable regulators better manage contagion. After an extensive literature review of articles from the Finance and Law disciplines, we put together a set of indicators that identify causes of systemic risk in SB (grouped into micro and macro-level linkages) and consequences of systemic risk observed in the RBS. This leads to a predictive structural model comprised of two latent exogenous constructs within the SB domain explaining the latent endogenous construct, which in turn, explains the observed consequences of systemic risk in RBS. In a first application of PLS-SEM (partial least squares structural equation modeling) in financial stress testing, we demonstrate how this technique can be used to explain contagion from SB to RBS. Results indicate that around 75% of the variation in systemic risk in RBS can be explained by micro and macro-level linkages traced to SB; the two path coefficients between the exogenous latent constructs and the endogenous latent construct are statistically significant.
Introduction
This article illustrates how transmission of systemic risk from shadow banking (SB) to the regulated banking sector (RBS) can be modelled in an effort to help regulators better monitor and manage contagion. Shadow banking, also known as 'market-based financing', includes non-bank channels such as real estate investment trusts, leasing companies, credit guarantee outlets and money market funds. Credit intermediation in SB alters the maturity, quality and liquidity of traditional credit products. SB can be regarded as providing banking intermediation without public liquidity and credit guarantees. According to the UK Financial Stability Board's (FSB) report, shadow banking makes a significant contribution to financing the real economy; for example, in 2013 shadow banking assets represented 25% of total financial system assets (FSB 2014) .
Systemic risk is defined by Gart (1994, p.134) as "…the clear and present danger that problems in financial institutions can be transmitted rapidly to other institutions or markets, inflicting damage on those institutions, their customers, and, ultimately, the economy at large." In the period leading up to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09, a large portion of financing of securitized assets was handled by the shadow banking sector (Gennaioli et al. 2013) . Thus, the collapse of SB during 2007-09 played an important role in weakening the regulated banking sector that relies on maintaining relationships with firms rather than arm's length financing often provided by capital markets. Ironically, shadow banking was assumed to be safe partly due to liquidity and credit put options provided by the private sector. Adrian and Ashcraft (2012, p.100) state "The operations of many shadow banking vehicles and activities are symbiotically intertwined with traditional banking and insurance institutions". Because of the strong interconnectedness between the two banking sectors, SB can become a source of systemic risk -an area of major concern to all regulators. As systemic risk rises, distressed banks reduce lending to clients, who in turn invest less, thus reducing employment. Thus, a main motivation for mitigating systemic risk is the harm caused to citizens when financial institutions fail and the effects of such failures are transferred to the real economy. As part of the interaction between SB and RBS, there also exists a concern that banks might be evading increased regulation by shifting activities to shadow banking. As the Basel III Accord moves towards full implementation by 2019 with a focus on better preparing financial institutions for the next crisis, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA) unfolds in the USA, the contribution of SB to systemic risk in RBS needs to be closely monitored. 3 Interconnectedness that may start the spread of systematic or non-diversifiable risk carried by various financial institutions can become systemic risk in RBS via direct or indirect linkages with SB. For example, in broad terms, direct linkages are created when shadow banking entities are owned by banks or have dealings with them. On the other hand, indirect linkages can be thought of as the two sectors investing in similar assets or becoming exposed to common counterparties. Other specific examples to interlinkages include backup lines of credit, implicit guarantees to special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and asset management subsidiaries, the outright ownership of securitized assets on bank balance sheets, and credit put options by insurance firms (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012, p.100) . According to FSB (2013, p.21 ) "These connections create a contagion channel through which stress in one sector can be transmitted to the other, and can be amplified back through feedback loops."
One of the key findings of Calluzzo and Dong (2015) is that over the period 2005-11 financial markets have become more vulnerable to contagion of systemic risk. Gennaioli et al. (2013) argue that securitization enhances the growth of bank balance sheets by diversifying idiosyncratic risk of loans, but it also raises the level of connectedness among financial institutions, thus concentrating exposure to systematic or market risk, and eventually to systemic risk when multiple institutions fail. At the same time, neglected tail aggregate risks on risky loans -such as the steep fall in house prices prior to the GFC and absence of accurate models to price collateralized debt obligations or loan obligations -can interact with idiosyncratic risk and lead to financial fragility. Gennaioli et al. (2013) maintain that according to the regulatory arbitrage view, banks pursue securitization using special or structured investment vehicles (SIVs) to circumvent capital requirements. In the period leading up to the GFC, traditional banks' entry into shadow banking through SIVs and SPVs created strong interdependencies and enabled RBS to engage in almost unrestricted leverage. 2 Banks were able to maintain higher leverage and still comply with risk-weighted capital requirements by transforming some assets into highly rated securities. Such a strategy makes banks more vulnerable to shocks. Acharya and Richardon (2009, p.85) link the regulatory arbitrage view to the idea of 'too-big-to-fail' (TBTF) where banks take on additional risks, that is, retain tail risks, and provide liquidity guarantees to SIVs or SPVs based on the expectation of a bailout. 3 According to Erel et al. (2014) , larger banks are likely to participate in higher levels of securitization because their expectations of being bailed out are also higher. FSB (2011, p.5) reports that "Although Basel III closes a number of identified shortcomings, both the incentives for, and the risks associated with, regulatory arbitrage will likely increase as Basel III raises the rigor of bank regulation." Therefore, the main motivation behind this study is to examine to what extent transmission of systemic risk from SB to RBS can be monitored. Later on we attempt this via partial least squares structural 2 Investment opportunities in shadow banking can be further diversified by structuring a collateralized SIV in tranches of senior, mezzanine and junior, where the latter two tranches are designed to absorb any losses before the senior tranches. 3 A financial institution is often considered TBTF when it has significant connections with other firms either through direct contractual relationships or through its potential to impact markets (Anabtawi and Schwarcz 2013). 4 equation modeling (PLS-SEM) using data from the US financial system; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of PLS-SEM in the field of financial stress testing.
There is a wealth of information on the interconnectedness of the financial system and regulation both in Finance and Law journals. Yet, these disciplines appear to ignore the body of knowledge generated by the other when we examine lists of references in such articles. Further motivated by this observation, we attempt to strike a balance by tapping into both disciplines as we explore the feasibility of monitoring transmission of systemic risk. The rest of the article unfolds with a literature review that describes banking in the USA, continues the discussion on the interconnectedness of the financial system and develops a conceptual framework for predictive modelling of transmission of systemic risk. This is followed by a description of data and an outline of the PLS-SEM method. Following reporting of the results to emerge from the PLS-SEM analysis, some concluding remarks are offered.
Literature review
The country focus in the rest of the study is primarily on USA. Thus, we begin this section with an introduction to the US banking systems. There are two separate banking systems in the USA where each is governed by different legal regimes. Those financial institutions that carry a banking charter belong to the traditional depository banking system often evaluated as three tiers, namely, city banks, regional banks and community banks -referred to as the regulated banking sector; most US banks are owned by bank holding companies (BHC) supervised by the Federal Reserve (The Fed). On the other hand, those who do not have a charter belong to the shadow banking system, e.g. investment banks, money market mutual funds (MMMFs), hedge funds, and insurance firms. 4 The key difference between the regulated banks and shadow banks is that the former are allowed to fund their lending activities through insured deposits (capped at US$100,000 per account), whereas the latter are prohibited by federal law to use deposits. Therefore, shadow banks depend on deposit-substitutes in a mostly unregulated and uninsured environment.
Over the last 30 years or so shadow banking has become increasingly dependent on various forms of short-term funding that substitute for functionality of deposits, e.g. over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (traded outside regulated exchanges), short-term repurchase agreements (repos are regarded as fully secured short-term loans), commercial papers, MMMF shares, prime brokerage accounts and securitized assets.
Unfortunately, during a financial crisis, the reliance on deposit-substitutes can have a contagion effect in the wider economy. For example, multinational corporations use MMMFs to fund their day-to-day cash needs.
During the GFC, MMMFs were the primary buyers of commercial paper used by financial institutions as well as non-financial corporations such as General Electric and Ford (Jackson 2013) . When MMMFs failed, large corporations were unable to sell their commercial paper to raise cash for their operations. Chernenko 5 and Sunderam (2014) argue that instabilities associated with MMMFs were central to the GFC. An example to a negative spillover is the case where an MMMF adds a risky firm to its portfolio, leading to investors withdrawing funds from that MMMF, and finally limiting of funds available to creditworthy firms financed by the same MMMF. If it were not for the US Federal government's determined implementation of various guarantees, emergency loans and capital infusions, many non-financial corporations would also have declared bankruptcy alongside financial institutions.
Given externalities or moral hazard problems such as implicit expectations on part of shadow banks to be bailed out in times of crises, it is unlikely that the shadow banking sector will implement optimal protections or fully hedge their risks. Furthermore, Schwarcz (2013) maintains that disintermediation in SB can amplify systemic risk. Therefore, there is a strong argument in favor of regulating how the shadow banking sector relies on deposit-substitutes, and the systemic risk channeled to RBS. Currently, the statutory authority in the USA to regulate deposit-substitutes is inadequate because the existing framework has gaps that can be exploited by the participants in the shadow banking sector. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act provides The Fed with authority to limit short-term debt activities by bank holding companies with over US$50 billion in total assets -yet there are many BHC that are below this threshold (Jackson 2013). 6 Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can only oversee MMMFs and some brokerdealers unaffiliated with banks that are members of The Fed. In Finance literature, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) , among others, show evidence of fragility for banks financed with short-term funding that is often the domain of SB.
Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2013) maintain that the Dodd-Frank Act has a strong ex ante regulatory bias, i.e. the emphasis is on prevention that is likely to draw opposition from the financial sector and may encourage regulatory arbitrage. The authors make the point that ex ante regulation needs to be accompanied with ex post regulation that brings safety nets as well as mechanisms designed to disrupt the transmission of systemic risk. More importantly, Rixen (2013) states that only about 20% of the rules proposed by DFA have so far been implemented by various US regulatory agencies, and that DFA does not specify targets for capital requirements; devising targets is the responsibility of The Fed and the Financial System Oversight Council (FSOC) established under the Dodd-Frank Act. FSOC also has the responsibility to identify and address threats to financial stability. This study models transmission of systemic risk in an effort to help regulators better predict what is likely to happen in the regulated banking sector we heavily depend on for a well-functioning lifestyle.
5 Disintermediation can intensify information failure, and thus systemic risk, as it builds on a decentralised structure. Disintermediation can also contribute to agency failure as exemplified by conflicts between middle and senior managers, e.g. middle managers provide value-at-risk analysis to senior managers who are often not qualified or time-poor to double-check submitted work (Schwarcz 2013) . 6 The threshold of US$50 billion specified by DFA attempts to define systemic importance in terms of size. 6
Interconnectedness of the financial system
The well-known prudential regulation's main focus is on identifying and mitigating exposure to endogenous crises within individual financial institutions, thus regulating leverage through internal risk management policies overseen by boards of directors. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) Macroprudential policies designed by regulators such as The Fed are in recognition of systemic risk being a negative externality where firms lack private incentives to minimize it (Liang 2013). Macroprudential regulation fills the gaps in prudential regulation by simultaneously focusing attention on institution-specific endogenous factors and network-related exogenous factors that give rise to systemic risk. While the micro and macro-level regulations need to function seamlessly in order to effectively identify systemic risk and mitigate it, this study's focus is on the ability to identify systemic risk arising from linkages. Thus, we continue by expanding on key linkages between RBS and SB already mentioned in the preceding sectionswith a view to laying the groundwork for a systemic risk framework that could enable monitoring contagion.
A good starting point is the article by Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011) that discusses regulating systemic risk. The authors premise their extensive arguments on the need for regulatory intervention but highlight the absence of an analytical framework that could help the regulators -in particular regarding how systemic risk is transmitted. Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011) also express strong concern about the market participants being unreliable in interrupting and limiting transmission of systemic risk.
First, Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011) posit an intra-firm correlation between a firm's exposure to the risk of low probability adverse events that can cause economic shocks and a firm's financial integrity.
Second, the authors put forward the concept of an inter-firm correlation among financial firms and markets, 7 ESRB was established in December 2010 and OFR was established with the Dodd-Frank Act enacted in 2010. 8 Counterparty refers to each of the two parties to a bilateral contract. According to Johnson (2013, p.906 ) "In a derivatives agreement the counterparty described as the buyer generally owns an asset and, therefore, faces risk that the asset may decline in value…The buyer in the derivatives contract seeks protection against the default risk and the seller agrees to cover some percentage or all of the loss that the buyer may experience if the issuer defaults…" 7 where interaction with the intra-firm correlation can facilitate transmission of otherwise localized economic
shocks. An example to intra-firm correlation from the GFC is the fall in home prices (a low probability risk) leading to defaulting of asset-backed securities and erosion of the integrity of institutions heavily invested in such securities. An example to inter-firm correlation is the failure to fully appreciate the interconnectedness among traditional financial institutions and institutions such as Bear Stearns (failed in 2008), Lehman Brothers (failed in 2008), AIG and other shadow banking institutions. According to Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011, p.1356) , "Operating together, however, these correlations create a transmission mechanism that can allow even what might appear to be a modest localized adverse economic shock to generate severe systemic consequences." 9 Effective regulation that weakens the above-mentioned correlations can reduce the enormous costs associated with financial crises.
Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011 Schwarcz ( , p.1368 define complexity in the financial system as "…the elaborate web of financial and legal relationships that increasingly underlies financial assets, investment securities, and financial markets". Thus, complexity can make it particularly difficult to appreciate different correlations and how they interact with each other. Overall, complexity detracts from the ability to identify intra-firm correlations because managers find it more difficult to assess risk of various financial products. It also gives rise to information asymmetry between an investor and the originator of an instrument. Under the indirect holding system found in trading of debt and equity securities, financial intermediaries hold securities on behalf of investors, thus making it difficult for others to identify the ultimate owners and related credit risk exposures. Essentially, complexity means cost of risk assessment can outweigh the perceived benefits. Cognitive limitations to processing and assessing complex financial and legal relationships will further discourage in-house analyses, relying instead on credit rating agencies' simpler and more general assessments.
When we consider the financial system as consisting of a network of institutions that interact at various levels, then complexity is also implicated in the inter-firm correlation. In a network, there is always the potential for a shock to be amplified through feedback loops. For example, during the GFC of 2007-09, the real estate bubble was partially made possible by additional capital flowing into mortgage securities, thus increasing capital availability to write more mortgages, in particular subprime home loans. Essentially, one bubble fed the other, creating a feedback loop. However, the domino model of contagion assumes shocks are transmitted directly between firms that belong to the financial system network but it does not account for the equally important indirect transmissions through the impact of firms' decisions on markets. For example, firms experiencing margin calls are often forced to engage in a fire sale of assets which depresses market prices through a feedback effect. We can also argue that when contagion stops, amplification continues 9 The financial crisis that started in 2007 turned into the GFC as a result of these correlations combining to transmit economic shocks across many countries because counterparty risks were deemed too high to continue to extend credit. A similar withdrawal by investors simply exacerbated the situation and lack of credit lead to collapses in the real economy. Such a series of events reflects interconnectedness and forms the essence of what gives rise to systemic risk.
through mounting defaults among the institutions indebted to one another (Glasserman and Young 2015).
Complexity can also arise from technological innovation, e.g. high frequency algorithmic trading that can add to loss spirals.
Another publication that attempts to make sense of interconnectedness and systemic risk is by Judge (2012) that focuses on financial innovation and resulting complexity that can lead to systemic risk. Judge (2012, p.661) identifies four sources of complexity, "(1) fragmentation, (2) the creation of contingent and dynamic economic interests in the underlying assets, (3) a latent competitive tendency among different classes of investors, and (4) the lengthening of the chain separating an investor from the assets ultimately underlying its investment." It is then argued that complexity contributes to information loss and stickiness (the latter refers to arrangements in markets that are difficult to modify) -both of which are sources of systemic risk. For example, as a mortgage-backed security is converted into a collateralized debt obligation (CDO), new fragmentation nodes are created with a much more complex arrangement that introduces many more investors with stake in the original mortgage loan.
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In short, the longer the chain separating an investor from an investment, the more difficult it becomes for investors to exercise due diligence in assessing risk and value. Rixen (2013) argues that shadow banking is primarily incorporated in lightly regulated offshore financial centers (OFCs). OFCs can be regarded as an extreme expression of jurisdictional competition.
OFCs have two main functions in the form of regulatory or tax havens. SPVs and SIVs benefit from regulatory and tax advantages offered by such havens. Rixen (2013, p.438-439) maintains that OFCs can increase financial risk in at least five different ways by (1) making it easier to register SPVs and SIVs, (2) enabling onshore financial institutions to hide risks, (3) raising the incentives for risky behavior, (4) helping avoid quality checks on credit that it is to be securitized, and (5) nurturing the debt bias found in investments.
Summing up interconnectedness, a financial firm's potential contribution to systemic risk can be viewed as a function of two main variables, namely, the extent its assets are correlated with the market and counterparty relationships. Similarly, complexity in the financial markets can be viewed as leading to information loss and stickiness, and ultimately, systemic risk. Regulators' main tasks in mitigating systemic risk should be to encourage less fragmentation and shorter chains between investors and investments, monitor existing linkages while looking out for new linkages, and disrupt transmission mechanisms. In the next section, we develop a conceptual framework designed to capture transmission of systemic risk from shadow banking to the regulated banking sector. 9
Conceptualizing a predictive model for contagion
We now pull together the linkages between SB and RBS already discussed in order to conceptualize a predictive model for shadow banking's contribution to systemic risk in the regulated banking sector.
According to Johnson (2013, p.886 ) "Regulation must address the increasing interconnectedness between regulated financial institutions and shadow banking institutions, the economic transactions within the shadow banking system, and regulated financial institutions' use of shadow banking instruments." The preceding literature review has revealed the following key potential linkages between SB and RBS that can give rise to systemic risk:  Excessive leverage in RBS supported by SB, e.g. excessive off-balance sheet securitization undertaken by regulated banks through SIVs and SPVs that handle shadow banking products.
 Questionable credit/liquidity put options by insurance firms covering promised payments in case of insolvency, e.g. if such puts are not robust (i.e. underestimate risks), then in a crisis situation liquidity cannot be sustained because the insurers can themselves become bankrupt.
 Shadow banking deposit-substitutes such as derivatives, short-term repos, commercial paper, MMMF shares, prime brokerage accounts and securitized assets as avenues for investment by RBS as well as multinational corporations, thus creating potentially negative feedback loops, e.g. if an MMMF facility in SB fails, a multinational that is part of the real economy depending on financing daily operations through commercial paper purchased by the MMMF in question can find itself in financial strife, which in turn could affect the multinational's commercial relationship with banks in RBS.
 Multilayered fragmentation nodes in securitized assets adding to complexity, e.g. the extent of CDOs and similar obligations with tranches and the length of the intermediation chain.
 Associations with offshore financial centers.
 Extent assets of a given institution are correlated with the market, i.e. if there is evidence of herding behavior where most institutions invest in similar assets, then movements in profits/losses are amplified.
 Executive compensation in SB institutions that may encourage excessive risk taking.
According to Weiβ et al. (2014) , despite a large quantity of empirical literature on systemic risk and the accompanying transmission mechanisms, evidence is inconclusive (Bisias et al. 2012 provide an extensive survey of systemic risk analytics). Yet, tracking systemic risk is a core activity in enabling macroprudential regulation (Jin and De Simone 2014) . Starting from the above summary of linkages, Table   1 outlines the causes of systemic risk in SB and consequences of systemic risk in RBS in an effort to draft a list of potential indicators (manifest variables) that can be used for predictive modeling.
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Our indicator- 11 We dub this list of indicators "researchers' theoretical wish-list" because most of the data on formative indicators and some of the data on the reflective indicators cannot be accessed for various reasons. For example, in addition to commercial databases, we perused individual BHC submissions of FORM 10-K (annual report) required by the Securities and Exchange Commission. We found inconsistent reporting formats and scant useful data. We doubt that regulators are in a better position under the current based approach to modeling systemic risk is one favored by regulators such as the Basel Committee and reflects both microprudential and macroprudential perspectives, i.e. intra-firm and inter-firm correlations, or micro-level and macro-level linkages.
[Insert Table 1 about here] We now outline the core hypotheses that will be tested through PLS-SEM:
H 1 : Systemic risk in shadow banking makes a significant contribution to systemic risk in the regulated banking sector.
H 1A : Systemic risk sourced from intra-firm correlations or micro-level linkages emanating from shadow banking make a significant contribution to systemic risk in the regulated banking sector.
H 1B : Systemic risk sourced from inter-firm correlations or macro-level linkages emanating from shadow banking make a significant contribution to systemic risk in the regulated banking sector.
Essentially, H 1 tests the main argument mounted so far that there is a substantial transmission of systemic risk from SB to RBS. Similarly, H 1A tests the significance of contagion via micro-level linkages, whereas H 1B tests the main contention behind the need for macroprudential regulation, that is, contagion via network related exogenous factors or macro-level linkages. Similar to Glasserman and Young (2015), we avoid starting the investigation with a pre-defined network structure or topology because we consider financial networks to be dynamic in nature. According to Calluzzo and Dong (2015) systemic risk within integrated markets is difficult to quantify and dynamically changing. Furthermore, research on how risk is transmitted is still in its early stages due to inadequate data and complex linkages (Liang 2013).
Data and method

Data
We focus on BHCs because most banks in the U.S., particularly those at mature stages of their operations, are owned by bank holding companies (Partnership for Progress 2011). Furthermore, the structures of BHCs allow them to diversify their portfolios and banking activities (Strafford 2011 ). The working sample of 63
BHCs after removing those with missing values are for the year 2013, and those in the sample represent 82.35% of the cumulative total assets for all the BHCs in that year (sourced from BankScope).
For the purposes of illustrating predictive modelling, we start with seven reflective indicators (selection is partly based on data availability) and ten formative indicators from the potential list originally reporting system -a point raised by the Director at the Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, Federal Reserve Board (Liang 2013, p.134) . 11 summarized in Table 1 . 12 The set of formative indicators is comprised of five indicators of microprudential focus capturing intra-firm relationships defining one of the two exogenous constructs, and five indicators of macroprudential focus capturing inter-firm relationships defining the other exogenous construct (see Table   A1 in Appendix A for details of the selected variables). Summary statistics on the variables reported in Table 2 indicate non-normal data as evidenced by substantial skewness and kurtosis across about half the variables (observed, as well as simulated).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In the absence of data on the formative indicators in the public domain, we simulate such data as detailed in Appendix A by making certain we use the systemic risk levels indicated by the observed data on reflective indicators and adjusting for firm size where relevant. Our simulation process for formative indicators starts by dividing each observed potential reflective indicator of a BHC into 3 quantiles (see Appendix A, Table A1 , second column). These 3 quantiles are defined as the upper, middle, and lower ranges, i.e. a 3-tiered range. Depending on the number of reflective indicators that each BHC exhibits within these quantiles, a BHC is then assigned to one of eleven systemic risk categories (see Table A2 ). A random normal distribution for each formative indicator is simulated and bounded by the tiered range as given by a set of rules based upon the systemic risk category of each BHC (see Table A3 ). The tiered ranges for the formative indicators are defined by the range of maximum and minimum values of formative indicators based upon assumptions in the systemic risk literature for BHCs. Furthermore, certain formative indicators require an additional simulation step to account for firm size captured by total assets. These are formative indicators 4, 5, 7, and 9. In this scenario, each of the original upper, middle and lower ranges for the formative indicator now have 3-quantiles in each range, thus creating 9 quantiles. For example, if a BHC is considered to have a formative indicator that is in the middle range from the first step, and is noted to be in the upper range in terms of firm size, the random simulation will occur in the 6th quantile.
Method: Partial least squares structural equation modeling
For the first time in the field of financial stress studies where a variety of early warning systems are found Table 1 in Hair et al. 2014b for a breakdown of business disciplines using PLS-SEM). The goal of the non-parametric PLS-SEM is to maximize the explained variance of endogenous latent constructs whereby the assumption of multivariate normality is relaxed.
14 Given the extent of dynamic interconnectedness in the US financial system, we also treat systemic risk as a latent construct representing a phenomenon that cannot be directly observed and avoid defining yet another network topology. The study's main objective remains one of modeling and understanding the transmission of systemic risk from shadow banking to the regulated banking sector through a first illustration of PLS-SEM in this field.
In this study, PLS-SEM is used to develop a predictive model, that is, starting from known causes of systemic risk in shadow banking captured by formative indicators and estimating the extent we can predict consequences of systemic risk in the regulated banking sector captured by reflective indicators (see Table   A1 and the illustrative Figure 1 ). According to Jöreskog and Wold (1982, p.270 ) "PLS is primarily intended for causal-predictive analysis in situations of high complexity but low theoretical information." In summary, use of the PLS-SEM approach is recommended when
• "The goal is predicting key target constructs or identifying key 'driver' constructs.
• Formatively measured constructs are part of the structural model. Note that formative measures can also be used with CB-SEM, but doing so requires construct specification modifications (e.g. the construct must include both formative and reflective indicators to meet identification requirements).
• The structural model is complex (many constructs and many indicators).
• The sample size is small and/or the data are non-normally distributed.
• The plan is to use latent variable scores in subsequent analyses." (Hair et al. 2014a, p.19) .
Other advantages of PLS-SEM over its better known cousin -covariance based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) -are a focus on predicting dependent latent variables (often a key objective in empirical studies) and ability to accommodate indicators with different scales (Hair et al. 2014a) . In this context, the distinction between formative and reflective indicators is particularly important:
 Formative indicators are considered causes of the associated exogenous latent constructs. We try to minimize the overlap among them because they are treated as complementary (see the left hand side of Table A1 for formative indicators likely to lead to systemic risk in shadow banking). The exogenous latent constructs illustrated in Figure 1 become the dependent variables in multiple regression where the 14 See Hair et al. (2011 Hair et al. ( , 2012 Hair et al. ( , 2014a Hair et al. ( and 2014b for an introduction to PLS-SEM, and Monecke and Leisch (2012) for a step-bystep explanation of the mathematics behind its algorithm. (Wold 1982) . At the beginning of the algorithm, all the manifest variables in the data matrix are scaled to have a zero mean and unit variance. The algorithm estimates factor scores for the latent constructs by an iterative procedure where the first step is to construct each latent construct by the weighted sum of its manifest variables. The inner approximation procedure (step 2) reconstructs each latent construct by its associated latent construct(s), i.e. as a weighted sum of neighboring latent constructs. The outer approximation procedure (step 3) then attempts to locate the best linear combination to express each latent construct by its manifest variables, in the process generating coefficients known as outer weights. While the weights were set to one during initialization, in step 3 weights are recalculated based on latent construct values emerging from the inner approximation in step 2. In step 4, latent constructs are put together again as the weighted sum or linear combination of their corresponding manifest variables to arrive at factor scores. The algorithm terminates when the relative change for the outer weights is less than a pre-specified tolerance (following each step, latent constructs are scaled to have zero mean and unit variance).
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14 As a result the PLS-SEM algorithm provides the latent variable scores, reflective loadings and formative weights in the measurement models, estimations of the path coefficients in the structural model, and the R-squared values of endogenous latent variables. These results allow computing many additional results and quality criteria such as Cronbach's alpha, the composite reliability (preferred in PLS-SEM), the Table 1 in Hair et al. (2014b) lists the top three reasons for PLS-SEM usage as non-normal data, small sample size and presence of formative indicators (all of these conditions exist in this study's data set).
Results
The testing procedure followed is detailed in Appendix B. Essentially, we begin with the ten formative indicators (five for each of the two exogenous constructs) and seven reflective indicators for the endogenous construct detailed in Table A1 
Concluding remarks
We embarked on this project to illustrate how transmission of systemic risk from SB to RBS can be modelled in order to help regulators monitor contagion. Initially, we identified various micro and macrolevel linkages between SB and RBS following an extensive literature review that brought together Finance and Law disciplines. To address an extensive amount of missing data on causes of systemic risk in shadow banking, we opted to simulate formative indicator data by establishing linkages to the observed reflective indicator data. The structural model to emerge consisted of two latent exogenous constructs of micro and macro-level linkages embedded in SB explaining the latent endogenous construct on systemic risk in RBS.
Statistically significant results based on PLS-SEM predictive modelling indicate that around 75% of the variation in systemic risk in RBS can be explained by micro and macro-level linkages that can be traced to SB. The significant path coefficients between the two exogenous constructs and the endogenous construct highlight the importance of the more traditional microprudential regulation, as well as macroprudential regulation.
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The finding that micro-level linkages have a greater impact on contagion of systemic risk (compared to macro-level linkages) is significant. It suggests that internal risk management within BHCs have a greater role in reducing the likelihood of systemic risk events. Although central banks and other regulators can impose macroprudential frameworks on the markets, these appear to have a lower impact on reducing the likelihood of spread of systemic risk within RBS. Regulators can use the approach illustrated in this article to monitor transmission of systemic risk. As Majerbi and Rachdi (2014) point out in their study of probability of systemic banking crises across a sample of 53 countries, stricter banking regulation, supervision and bureaucratic efficiency generally result in reduced probability of crises.
A more advanced application of the predictive modelling illustrated in this article can incorporate scenario analysis using projected data. That is, once model parameters that are stable over time are identified, projected data on formative indicators representing potential negative developments in SB can be used to predict reflective indicator levels in RBS. Such an extension of this study will require running PLS-SEM over a number of years and observing path coefficients and loadings for various indicators. According to Hair et al. (2014a, p.19 ) PLS-SEM is highly suited to situations where the intention is to use latent variable scores in subsequent studies.
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Appendix A: The data simulation process In general, bank holding companies (BHCs) with higher systemic risk levels (as captured by the reflective indicators) should be traced to BHC characteristics (as captured by the formative indicators) with greater importance weights, i.e. greater causes of systemic risk in shadow banking (see Table A1 ). Predictive PLS-SEM modelling follows from the seventeen variables detailed in Table A1 . 
A1: Categorization of BHCs into eight systemic risk categories
Based on seven reflective indicators, we sort the BHCs into eleven categories according to the level of systemic risk in descending order, e.g., Category 1 has the highest systemic risk and Category 11 has the lowest systemic risk. All variables are divided into three-tier range derived from the sample (N=63), e.g. lower (below 25 th percentile), middle
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(between the 25 th and 75 th percentile) and upper (above the 75 th percentile) ranges. The BHC categories are classified as given in Table A2 . Starting with the systemic risk category determined as per Table A2 , simulations of formative indicators for each BHC in the sample are generated from a random uniform distribution within the minimum and maximum values indicated in Table A1 . Table A3 summarizes the simulation process for each formative indicator based on the BHC systemic risk category. All variables are divided into a three-tier range, e.g. lower (below 25 th percentile), middle (between the 25 th and 75 th percentile) and upper (above the 75 th percentile) ranges (see Table A1 for the ranges used). 
A3: Accounting for firm size in the simulation
For example, formative indicator #4 requires an additional simulation step to reflect its relationship to firm size (total assets). That is, once a BHC's range for the formative indicator #4 is determined in line with its systemic risk category (e.g. under Category 1, this range is 'upper', whereas under Category 3 the range changes to 'middle'), an additional set of three-tier range within that range is applied based on firm size represented by total assets. To illustrate, during the first set of simulations, if formative indicator #4 falls within the upper range (above the 75 th percentile), we will determine if the bank is located in the upper, middle or lower ranges in terms of total assets. Based upon the three-tier range in terms of firm size, a second simulation for formative indicator #4 is run. This additional step is included because larger firms have a greater likelihood of managing more risk-weighted executive compensation packages. A similar treatment is extended to formative indicators #5, 7, and 9.
Appendix B: Procedure followed for predictive model assessment using PLS-SEM in SmartPLS software (See Table 3 in Hair et al. 2011, and Hair et al. (2012 Hair et al. ( , 2014b , composite reliability is a better measure of internal consistency because it avoids underestimation often seen with Cronbach's alpha and accommodates differences in indicator reliabilities expected by PLS-SEM, i.e. composite reliability does not assume tau- 
REVOMAL OF LOW-LOADING REFLECTIVE INDICATORS:
1. Remove the reflective indicator #5 outlined in Table A1 'Relative efficiency scores based on CPM' and check all other results.
2. If the above removal leads to improvement of statistical criteria, next remove the reflective indicator #1 in Table   A1 'Total regulatory capital ratio' before checking the results again.
3. Finally, remove the 'Non-interest income ratio' -the reflective indicator #2 in Table A1 .
Removing the relative efficiency scores improves internal consistency, convergent validity and discriminant validity of the reflective measurement model; removal also improves the predictive relevance of the structural model (details are available from the corresponding author). We then sequentially remove the 'Total regulatory capital ratio' and the 'Non-interest income ratio' which leads to further improvements where the analysis converges in 22 iterations. The full report on the fourth test with ten formative and four reflective indicators is presented below: Step 1 Initialization
Step 5 Convergence?
Step 2 Inner approximation
Step 3 Outer approximation
Step 4 
